MSC BRIEFING

## CONFIDENTIAL

29 March 1955

## AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

- I. All but one of 25 countries invited by the five Colombo Powers have accepted bid to meet in Bandung on 18 Apr.
  - A. Only Central African Federation (newly-formed UK colony) has declined.
  - B. 29 conferees represent more than half of world's population (1.4 billion).
  - C. 15 of 29 share history as former colonies or protectorates of Western nations.
  - D. Of remainder, almost all have taken their lumps from "imperialist" West in past hundred years.
- Sponsors adopted no clear-cut qualifications in making up invitation list.
  - A. Even Mehru stated that invitees were "an odd assortment"
  - B. However, guests and sponsors alike are taking conference seriously, sending highest available official as chief delegate.
  - C. Biggest surprise -- whisp-bearded, frail ex-photoretoucher Ho Chi Minh, who, despite Moscow ties,
    is living representation of nationalism triumphant
    ever evil in eyes of many conferees.
- III. Provisional agenda reflects strong Indian influence, indicates that Nehru-as spokesman for the neutralists—will be a dominating figure.

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- A. Agenda stresses world peace, colonialism, racialism, nuclear energy, economic co-operation.
- B. Coexistence" and "progress in Indochina" top
  agenda, indicating that plea will be made for
  broader adherence to Chou-Nehru "five principles"
  and for unanimous support Geneva agreement.
- C. Sponsors vehemently deny desire to promote a new "bloc."
  - Bowever, final agenda item ("desirability of holding cultural festivals in participating countries on appropriate occasions") strongly suggests hope for development of permanent organization.
- D. Although sponsors also profess desire avoid controversy, agenda actually gravy-train for Communists.
  - Can assume posture on side of angels time after time, express pious views, avoid aggressive appearance.
- E. Indonesian president Sukarno's opening address may provide tip-off to tone of conference.
  - If he makes only routine velcoming statement,
     would indicate sponsors sincerely trying to
     keep meeting friendly.
  - 2. If bombastic speech instead, hitting primarily at West, bitter debate probable from very outset.

- IV. Chicons, Viet Minh working hard for big splant at Bandung.
  - A. Their propaganda calls Conference reflection of Asian-African desires for peace, protests against "colonislism."
  - B. At first, acquired US of trying wrock conference by discouraging attendance; now claim. US subotage plan, based on manipulation of "puppets."
  - C. Importance to Communists underlined by Chou's and He's Quadership respective) delegations.
    - 1. Both men not only extremely adroit negotiators, but possess unusual ability to charm others.
    - 2. Belegations will be well-briefed, prepared with definite program.
  - D. Measure of Communist expectations provided by large numbers Commis newsmen who will cover conference.
    - 1. 12 TASS men. 2 correspondents of London

      Daily Worker and 20-30 Chinese reporters.
    - Chinese reportedly requested facilities to send out 10,000 words a day.
- v. Communists will have chance for try-out of their Bandung "line" at 6-10 April dress rehearsal at New Delhi "Asian Conference to Relax International Tensions."
  - A. Belhi meeting, under auspices of Commie-front All India Peace Council, will be attended by number of

Asian, Middle Eastern Countries (414) USSR).
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- B. Agenda remarkably similar to Bandung's.
- VI. Expectations at Bandung:
  - A. Viet Minh--plug theme of Vietnam's "reunification" in fulfillment Geneva accord.
  - B. Chicom--press claim to Formosa, plant advance justifications for future actions.
- VII. In contrast, anti-Communist and pro-Vestern countries-although a substantial majority--apparently not preparing
  themselves nearly so vigorously as either Communists or
  Indians (spokessen for "neutralist" minority).
  - A. So far, little co-ordination of position.
  - B. Also, these nations themselves divided.
    - Middle Easterners--roughly along lines for and against Turk-Iraqi Pact.
    - 2. Asians-those for and against Manila Pact (plus some simply at loose ends).

VIII. Outlook for West, however, is not at all bad.

- A. 27 of 29 participants are non-Communists; 21 are strongly anti-Communist; of these, 12 are closely linked to West.
- B. Humbered among delegates are many experienced and elequent advocates of co-operation with Nest.
  - 1. Rosulo (Philippines).
  - 2. Zerlu (Turkey).
  - S. Was (Thailand).
  - 4. Jameli (Iraq). CONFIDENTIAL

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- 5. Mohammed Ali (Pakistan).
- 6. Kotelawala (Ceylon).
- 7. Halik (Lebanon) also may attend.
- C. Further factor favorable to West is possible development Sino-Indian rivalry.
  - Mehru not believed favorably disposed to domination of conference or show-stealing by Chicoms.
- IX. Outcome at Bandung difficult to forecast with precision.
  - A. Conference may wind up with succession of impocuous statements agreeable to widely-divergent viewpoints of participants.
  - B. Instead, may end with Communists and anti-Communists at sword points--to despair of hand-wringing neutrals.
  - C. However, no dramatic Communist victory appears likely.
    - Communists' most probable achievement temporary reduction of suspicions felt towards them by non-Commie participants.